Recent findings on psychosocial and neurodevelopmental anomalies in schizophrenia patients indicate that deficits related to social cognition-the ability to act wisely in social interactions-may be important constraints on complete social and vocational recovery. Social cognition is acquired over many decades and appears to be partially independent of formal IQ and neuropsychological problems. It invites a more developmental approach to the rehabilitation of schizophrenia, one that we call Cognitive Enhancement Therapy (CET). CET draws on an emerging literature that implicates both pre-and postonset neurodevelopmental difficulties, as well as a complementary literature on diffuse neuropsychological impairments that supports the notion of a neurodevelopmental insult. We analyzed evidence for an associated developmental basis to social cognitive impairment in the context of a model that addressed both the acquisition of interpersonal wisdom and the adaptive process that might follow developmental failures.
While improved outcomes have clearly been achieved with contemporary psychosocial treatments, most would acknowledge that a more complete social and vocational recovery remains an elusive goal for many patients with schizophrenia. Outcomes other than symptom improvement and relapse prevention have not been well documented . Perhaps as many as 10 percent of all incapacitated persons in the United States, for example, are disabled by schizophrenia (Rupp and Keith 1993) . Only 10 percent to 30 percent of schizophrenia patients on average are employed at any time (Attkisson et al. 1992) , and few of these are able to maintain their vocational gains (Policy Studies Associates 1989). Quality of life and the relationships needed to sustain it are often marginal for patients with schizophrenia (Lehman et al. 1982 ). This is not to say that psychosocial interventions are without important and well-established effects. Symptom alleviation, delay of relapse and rehospitalization, and the acquisition of behavioral skills and interpersonal effectiveness have been variably associated with assertive community treatment and case management (Scott and Dixon 1995a) ; family intervention (Dixon and Lehman 1995) ; and psychotherapeutic approaches, primarily social skills training (Scott and Dixon 1995fc ). Yet even the recent and most successful of our behavioral attempts to enhance the personal and social adjustment of schizophrenia patients with a disorder-relevant psychotherapy led us to conclude that while patients were significantly improved in work and relationship roles compared with controls, few were able to equal their own "at best" premorbid functioning in these areas (Hogarty et al. 1997 ). More recently, cognitive rehabilitation of schizophrenia patients has shifted to the sequential remediation of nonsocial cognitive impairments and social problemsolving deficits that might underlie interpersonal and vocational dysfunction. Published results to date have suggested the potential for further patient recovery. However, outcomes indicate that these improvements in symptom state and selected aspects of neuropsychological and behavioral functioning are without broad generalization to areas of community adjustment (Hodel and Brenner 1994) .
In light of the poorly understood rate-limiting factors to a fuller social and vocational recovery, we share a reevaluation that has influenced the conceptualization and implementation of a developmental approach to cognitive rehabilitation called Cognitive Enhancement Therapy (CET). We hope this initiative will respond to the recent recommendation that the study and treatment of cognition in schizophrenia should move beyond the focus on neuropsychological tasks and social problem solving to include (1) the processes that support socialization; (2) the reciprocal influence of memory and affect associated with past social exchanges and current functioning; and (3) the representation of multidisciplinary contributions to the study of social cognition, including contemporary models of normal cognition (Silverstein 1997) . Operational theory, in our experience, has systematically, effectively, and confidently guided clinical practice with patients whose disorders had remained enigmatic and suboptimally responsive to previous psychosocial interventions (Anderson et al. 1980; Hogarty et al. 1995) .
In this discussion, we propose that the recently suggested neurodevelopmental anomalies of schizophrenia might also implicate a developmental disability in social cognition that requires an appropriate developmental therapeutic response. Our distinction between "developmental" and "behavioral" rehabilitation are relative rather than absolute, because in practice cognitive rehabilitation would likely include features of both approaches. When we use the term developmental, we wish to imply a greater emphasis on real-life (unrehearsed but clinically guided) interpersonal experiences that are targeted to the secondary socialization process of attaining age-appropriate social cognitive milestones that reasonably stable and less severely impaired outpatients might not yet have achieved. A behavioral approach, on the other hand, would more likely be characterized by stepwise, didactic training to the criteria of topographic behavioral or cognitive tasks that are usually prescribed for severely impaired and often acutely ill inpatients through primary socialization experiences. Normal neurodevelopmental processes that reinforce crucial neural connections could have failed in schizophrenia (Feinberg 1997; Lewis 1997a) , and remediation of neuropsychological sequelae might likely be difficult to achieve (Benedict et al. 1994 ). But we shall suggest that the acquisition of context appraisal and perspective taking that are acquired through secondary socialization are central to adult social cognition and its "practical intelligence" and seem at least partially independent of neuropsychological integrity and generalized intelligence (Sternberg et al. 1995) . Normal subjects, at least, appear able to acquire practical intelligence over much of the life cycle (Sternberg et al. 1995) .
Secondary socialization is a lifelong process that includes context appraisal, or the acquired ability to apprehend and appropriately respond to the informal rules of conduct that characterize diverse social contexts and roles, particularly those that change spontaneously and often in unexpected ways (Berger and Luckman 1966; Brim 1966; Hay 1994) . Secondary socialization also includes perspective taking, a cognitive skill that requires rapid and correct assessment, attribution, and inferencemaking regarding one's own and another's thinking and feeling and the subsequent prediction of behavior (Berger and Luckman 1966; Baldwin 1992) . CET is guided by cognitive theory that facilitates a less demanding and more intuitive, abstracting, "gistful" approach to acquiring these secondary socialization skills (Brainerd and Reyna 1990) , rather than one that relies on the controlled, effortful, cognitive processing that often characterizes schizophrenia as well as much of its psychosocial treatment (Bellack et al. 1989; Bellack and Mueser 1993) . In deference to space and to our personal limitations in basic neuroscience as well as developmental, social, and cognitive psychology (we are neither neuropsychologists nor theorists), we rely on authoritative reviews of this extensive literature. Our primary objective is simply to bring theoretical concepts into the service of treatment development.
Our formulation is admittedly selective, but it is compatible with evidence from a broad interdisciplinary literature. No psychosocial treatment, to our knowledge, has attempted to accommodate all possible theoretical models. Our theoretical premises are not intended to be deterministic, linear, or reductionistic in nature. They do not, for example, imply an "inside-out," etiopathophysiologic cascade of effects that begins with impairments in neuroanatomy and extends to those that are neuropsychological in nature, which in turn determine impairments in cognition, symptomatic response, and ultimately dysfunctional behavior. This often-assumed connection between neuroscience and phenomenology seems decidedly incomplete (Mortimer and McKenna 1994) . Rather, our postulates recognize the inevitable synergy and hence interaction between acquired cognitive impairments, both social and nonsocial, as well as the individual dysfunctional adaptations to such and the potential for improvement that is offered by neuroplasticity (i.e., the possibility of neural circuit response to developmental exercises and experiences that are targeted to social cognitive enhancement).
Neurodevelopment and Schizophrenia
Converging lines of evidence increasingly indicate that schizophrenia has many developmental aspects (PogueGeile 1997) . The evidence supporting a neurodevelopmental basis to schizophrenia, as critically reviewed by Weinberger (1996) , extends from the less consistent findings associated with neurological soft signs, obstetrical complications, and fetal infection to the better documented problems in premorbid, nonsocial cognition and to the more compelling and recent findings from cytoarchitectonic studies. The latter suggest a neurodevelopmental vulnerability to later-life psychosis among some patients that follows an in utero, displaced migration of neurons to essential cortical plates. The result is an inappropriate decrease in neural connectivity in superficial cortical layers that is accompanied by an equally suspect increase in neural density in deeper white matter layers. Early inconsistencies in these observations have increasingly been clarified (Glantz and Lewis 1995; Akbarian et al. 1996) .
The potential causes of neurodevelopmental insult have been variably attributed to neonatal malnourishment (Susser and Lin 1992) , obstetrical complications (McNeil 1988) , and viral infection (Mednick et al. 1988) , either as isolated events or more likely as the result of a "double whammy" (Bracha et al. 1992 ) when combined with genetic vulnerability (Fish et al. 1992) . Weinberger (1987) suggested that these early problems of neural connectivity, particularly in the temporal-limbic and prefrontal cortices, might not become manifest until early adult life (perhaps as schizophrenia), a speculation supported by neonatally lesioned animals that show a delay both in the manifestation of abnormal behavior and in an associated dopaminergic hyperresponsiveness (Lipska et al. 1993) . Such abnormalities have yet to be found in all cases of schizophrenia studied, and, according to Weinberger (1996) , it remains unclear how such findings, often subtle in nature, might explain the clinical syndrome itself. Others (McCarley et al. 1996) minimize the "first hit" hypothesis and cite later developmental changes that follow the onset of schizophrenia (the "second hit"), such as (1) reductions in temporal and frontal lobe volume in the first years post onset, (2) an increasing delay of P300 latencies, (3) production of free radical or secondary neurotoxins, and (4) N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor dysfunction. Still, growing evidence that suggests a perinatal and young adult neurodevelopmental basis to schizophrenia, though incomplete and indirect, is not easily dismissed (Keshavan and Murray 1997) . Moreover, these observations are compatible with broad evidence that supports dynamic disruptions in schizophrenia patients in the interconnected, parallel distributed neural systems that are subsumed within the heteromodal association cortex (HASC; Pearlson et al. 1996) . The cerebral areas involved (the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, Broca's area, the superior temporal cortex, and the inferior parietal cortex) are the most recently evolved, phylogenetically, and are fundamental to normal human cognition, including such higher order social cognitive abilities as foresightfulness and reflectiveness. Associated evidence from neuroimaging studies (McCarley et al. 1996) , when integrated with the neuropathologal findings of the HASC (Pearlson et al. 1996) and limbic system anomalies (Kirkpatrick and Buchanan 1990 ) in schizophrenia, lends support to the possibility of a neurodevelopmentally based impairment in the structures that influence social cognition.
Neuropsychology and Schizophrenia
Volumes have been written on the nature of neuropsychological deficits in schizophrenia, and it is not our intent to discredit either their importance in understanding the pathophysiology of this disorder or their contribution to social dysfunction. Rather, we wish simply to encourage a greater clinical awareness of the social cognitive components that appear to us to have been de-emphasized in contemporary neuroscience and cognitive rehabilitation. An impartial overview of the neuropsychological literature would likely lead to the conclusion that nonsocial cognitive impairments are more diffuse and global than not (e.g., Goldstein 1978; Heaton et al. 1978; Seedman 1983; Straube and Oades 1992; Blanchard and Neale 1994) , an observation that is consistent with neurodevelopmental anomalies and with a growing literature that implicates impairments among many cerebral structures and their interconnected neural circuitry in schizophrenia (Buchanan et al. 1997) . (We do acknowledge findings of focal impairment and specific functional deficits in selected samples; see Gur 1978; Kolb and Whishaw 1983; Hoff et al. 1992; Pilowsky et al. 1993; Buchanan et al. 1994; Perry et al. 1995; Servan-Schreiber et al. 1996 . But a broad literature appears clearly to favor a global impairment.) A frequently cited characteristic of these diverse neuropsychological deficits is a pervasive slowness in behavioral responses to information processing and attentional tasks . This slowness may be a general indicator of the effortful (controlled) processing that follows extensive demands on cognitive capacity , at least with regard to laboratory tasks. (We shall return to this cognitive feature when we expand on the developmental acqui-sition of "normal" cognition.) Many patients with schizophrenia have a nonspecific task difficulty in establishing a cognitive set, sustaining vigilance especially in the face of competing stimuli, and shifting a focused alertness . Failures in short-term spatial and verbal memory functioning are also frequently observed (Park and Holzman 1992; Tamlyn et al. 1992) , as are executive function difficulties (Morice and Delahunty 1996) . Psychophysiological studies show problems in arousal, electrodermal activity, and evoked potentials, functions that also interact with and influence impaired information processing capacities Brekke et al. 1997) . However, it is important to remember that no brain structure can singularly explain the nature of any cognitive impairment, be it in attention, memory, or problem solving (Posner and Rafal 1987; Mesulum 1990; Hoffman and McGlashan 1993) . Further, the brain has a long-term, albeit decreasing, plasticity that appears to be dynamically engineered by experience, such as those that characterize more "procedural" (ongoing experiential learning) than "declarative" (rote memory) rehabilitation programs (Kami 1997) .
It is appealing to suggest that the problems of cortical connectivity implied by the cytoarchitectonic studies are responsible for neuropsychological test failures, which in turn might account for symptoms or social and vocational dysfunctioning. But such a conclusion has been viewed both as speculative (Weinberger 1996) and hazardous (Mortimer and McKenna 1994) . Evolutionary evidence describing human and nonhuman primates, for example, has led others to conclude that social cognition preceded and shaped neocortical functions (Brothers 1990) , and that social cognition itself might represent more basic, evolutionary cognitive processes of domain-specific "reasoning instincts" Tooby 1989, 1994) . These authors argue that the cognitive process of "social exchange" (e.g., memory for prior interactions or the communication of values) was likely influenced by the Pleistocene conditions of natural selection and thus required rational instincts for specific adaptive functions and species survival. The authors also extend an invitation to cognitive science to study what the brain has been programmed to do and why, as much as how it operates. (From this perspective, the rehabilitation of maladaptive social cognition should become an essential, rather than simply a desirable, goal of treatment.) The integrity of memory, attention, and problem solving are closely associated with individual attributions of importance to specific interpersonal stimuli as well as to motivation and environmental context (Baldwin 1992) . Attention to and memory for cognitive content depend on the uniquely personal meaning and emotions associated with important experiences (Prigatano 1987; Clark 1994) , which is an integration of affect and cognition that seems central to clinical change (Greenberg and Safron 1984) . Failures in laboratory measures of nonsocial cognition might reflect neglected stimuli that are not endowed with affective significance or that do not elicit a motive to respond (Ciompi 1988) . In fact, following an extensive review, Brothers (1990) concluded that "the core process which distinguishes social cognition is an intimate tie to affect." In this regard, we are reminded of the age-old tenet: "We do what we think, but what we think is what we feel" (cited in Straube and Oades 1992) .
Recent literature in schizophrenia does show important but modest correlations between the nonsocial cognitive functions of verbal memory and vigilance and the broad indices of social functioning (Green 1996) . However, few longitudinal studies assess the important relationships between neuropsychological or psychophysiological indices and social competencies over time (Green 1996; Brekke et al. 1997) . Also, much remains unknown about the real-world significance of nonsocial cognitive functions that are measured in the laboratory (Hogarty and Flesher 1992) . Failure in the laboratory, it has been argued, is not failure in life (Berrol 1990) . Subjects might avoid tasks in the community that would lead to "fluid intelligence" failures in the laboratory (more akin to formal IQ) and compensate by using "crystallized intelligence" (a practical intelligence) through the pursuit of personally meaningful, familiar, and less demanding tasks (Salthouse 1987) . Once again, this distinction implies the existence of cognitive processes and perhaps neural circuits that evolved in response to specific adaptive requirements Tooby 1989, 1994) . As comprehensively reviewed by Penn et al. (1997) , neuropsychological assessment of basic (nonsocial) cognition is often made through a subject's response to variables that might hold little or no personal significance, such as objects, colors, lights, numbers, or tones (e.g., "cold" cognition). The social-cognitive competence that is fundamental to a successful life, however, is developed and assessed through the independent and reciprocal interaction between the subject and another person (e.g., "hot" cognition). Neuropsychological markers may well have high diagnostic sensitivity in schizophrenia, but very little specificity has been shown (Szymanski et al. 1991; Keefe 1995) . Neuropsychological deficits also occur among individuals without clinical syndromes of mental illness or current social dysfunction (Brunke et al. 1991) , although such deficits might constrain social competence potential.
Thus, it is at least plausible that the neuropsychological deficits of schizophrenia patients that are usually targeted by rehabilitation programs might arise from one or more compromised cerebral structures that directly or indirectly influence other neural structures or circuits that support social cognition. (See Benes [1997] and Lewis [1991b] for descriptions of how secondary neural influences might evolve.) Among nonhuman primates, for example, sophistication in expressing "empathy," conflict resolution, reciprocity, and maintenance of a collaborative social order suggest relatively distinct neural circuits for social cognition (including orbital frontal cortex, basal ganglia, and amygdala) that likely predate human intelligence and the neocortex (Brothers 1990 ). The potential influence of basal ganglia and amygdala impairment on cognition in schizophrenia has recently been described, but these structures and their associated circuitry have been relatively neglected in the study of schizophrenia (Graybiel 1997; Haber and Fudge 1997) . Again, as argued by Tooby (1989, 1994) , these important aspects of social cognition might well have required specialized and evolutionary reasoning circuits for species survival. (Selecting a mate and selecting from a restaurant menu clearly necessitate different cognitive processes, to cite an example of these authors.) That social cognitive operations are directly represented in the results of nonsocial, neuropsychological assessment and treatment of schizophrenia patients has been questioned (Penn 1991) . As Penn and his colleagues concluded, social and nonsocial cognition require very different levels of analyses, and the latter measures "do not adequately explain the social impairment and symptomatology of the disorder" .
If neuropsychological deficits themselves are the principal rate-limiting factors against normative functioning, systematic remediation should facilitate social and vocational recovery. But the case for systematic remediation and recovery is equivocal, if not weak (Benedict et al. 1994 ). Many studies have indeed shown improvements in reaction time, vigilance, memory, and cognitive flexibility following training (Bellack and Mueser 1993) , but when such training was used as a precursor to social skills acquisition, evidence of durability and generalization to other real-life contexts is lacking (Hodel and Brenner 1994) . Our understanding of the neuropsychological literature, as it relates to schizophrenia rehabilitation, is as follows: (1) There is clear evidence that the acquisition of social skills is indeed constrained by neuropsychological deficits (Mueser et al. 1991; Kern et al. 1992; Bowen et al. 1994) , thus establishing the need to clinically accommodate nonsocial cognitive impairments. (2) Many studies indicate that nonsocial, cognitive deficit training is at least possible (see Spring and Ravden 1992; Hodel and Brenner 1994) . But, with a recent exception (Spaulding et al. 1999 , this issue), little or no evidence of generalization to untrained social behaviors has been observed (although many efforts did not have generalization as a goal). (3) Suggestive, but poorly replicated, evidence shows that broad cognitive "modification" improves untrained nonsocial cognition deficits (Meichenbaum and Cameron 1973; Lowe and Higson 1981; Spring and Ravden 1992) . (4) The effects of existing and "integrated" nonsocial and social cognitive (behavioral) approaches are decidedly modest on social and vocational recovery in the community (Bellack 1992; Liberman and Green 1992; Bellack and Mueser 1993; Hodel and Brenner 1994) . Thus, regarding the components of social and nonsocial cognition, questions remain that require a more direct therapeutic response as well as the method (e.g., developmental or behavioral) that might better address specific, functionally disabling deficits. While recent studies of behavioral interventions have indeed moved from the micro training of specific behavioral deficits to more macro "social problem-solving" exercises (Bellack et al. 1989) , there is a growing consensus that such skills are ultimately dependent on the hierarchical capacity of social abstraction. As Corrigan and Green (1993a) recently concluded, "The schizophrenic patient's relative insensitivity to abstract (social) cues may explain their limited repertoire of social skills." Sensitivity to abstract social cues appears to be a key precursor of social problem-solving ability (Corrigan and Toomey 1995) . Rather than skills training targeted to "topographic behaviors," Corrigan et al. (1996a) have argued from their extensive and relevant studies that:
Patients with schizophrenia have most difficulty with abstract components (associated with) the identification of goals and affect. Therefore, schizophrenic patients ... need to learn the rules and goals that guide interpersonal situations. In this way, they can 'generate' behaviors that meet the demands of a particular situation. This is a skill area that has largely been overlooked in current social skills training programs, (p. 82)
As such, behavioral approaches to the remediation of neuropsychological deficits have clearly improved the lives of many patients. It appears, however, that more optimal recovery of function, at least among less severely impaired and medication-responsive schizophrenia outpatients who have greater rehabilitation potential (i.e., the better half of patients), might require a developmental approach that addresses capacities that are broadly associated with an abstracting social cognition, one that itself is developmentally acquired.
Social Cognition and Schizophrenia
Much like the neurodevelopmental literature, evidence concerning social cognitive impairment in schizophrenia is recent and its assessment has largely relied on discrete and predominantly indirect components of social cognition such as affect perception, social knowledge, social problem solving, and processing bias .
Only recently have these components been viewed in the broader context of social cognitive processes that remain largely unassessed (Silverstein 1997) . As is the case with neuropsychological deficits, the evidence supporting social cognitive impairment is also nonspecific to schizophrenia, insofar as persistent social disability has increasingly been shown to characterize other psychiatric disorders as well (Coryell et al. 1993; Olfson et al. 1997) . Thorndike first described social cognition as a product of social intelligence, or the ability to "act wisely," eight decades ago (Walker and Foley 1973; Taylor 1990 ). Since then, more than 100 definitions and attempts at measurement have followed (Wyer and Srull 1994) . Over the years, certain commonalities have survived its analysis (Eisenberg and Harris 1984) : (1) an acquired ability in perspective taking, (2) interpersonal problem solving, (3) relationship maintenance, (4) moral judgment, and (5) communication skills. Social problem solving has received the most attention in the skills training literature (Bellack et al. 1989) . Our functional definition of social cognition has resolved to the essential elements identified by others: the ability to understand, predict, and appropriately respond to the thinking (including attributions and intentions), feeling, and likely behavior of self and others in diverse and often unrehearsed social contexts (e.g., Gazzaniga 1985; Taylor and Cadet 1989; Brothers 1990; Newman and Uleman 1993) . We believe that these essential characteristics of social cognition are best represented by the secondary socialization abilities of perspective taking and context appraisal (Brim 1966; Baldwin 1992; Berger and Luckman 1966) . We frequently use the term "social cognition" interchangeably with such terms as "practical," "tacit," or "social" intelligence when attempting to convey a form of interpersonal wisdom that seems both quasi-independent of formal IQ and neuropsychological integrity and capable of being developmentally acquired throughout life.
While the social cognitive abilities that determine social intelligence (and its associated and increasingly popular "emotional intelligence" [Goleman 1995 ]) appear to be part of generalized intelligence, they differ qualitatively from the abilities that determine formal IQ (Taylor 1990) . Depending on methodology and criteria, the shared variance between the practical intelligence that determines social performance and the generalized intelligence measured by IQ is alleged to be only 4 percent to 25 percent (Sternberg et al. 1995) . Traditional measures of IQ, for example, largely tap the verbal and logical skills associated with academic test taking; however, the awareness of the self and others that is necessary for a successful life remain unassessed (McClelland 1973) . Abstract social cue perception, a likely component of social cognition, has been shown to be at least partially independent of formal IQ in normal subjects as well as in schizophrenia patients (Corrigan 1994) . Social intelligence is thought to be the "compensatory" intelligence in those with modest intellectual ability who nonetheless lead interpersonally wise and productive lives (Salthouse 1987) . Conversely, social intelligence can be impaired among otherwise intellectually gifted individuals (Selman and Schultz 1990), such as the scientist who has a highly developed formal IQ but is interpersonally inept. We do not imply that social intelligence is independent of IQ across the entire spectrum of general intelligence. Even mild mental insufficiency, for example, can be the reason for a lack of great social wisdom in a person (an appreciation that has led to the exclusion of patients from CET whose IQ is < 80). The awareness of relationship features that is central to social intelligence has been described as a dynamic ability that is continuously influenced by changing contextual knowledge and experience (Salovey and Mayer 1990; Taylor 1990) . Formal IQ likely plateaus in early adult life, while social intelligence appears to increase over many decades (Sternberg et al. 1995) , a phenomenon that invites therapeutic intervention.
Our focus on social cognition as a potential rate-limiting factor to social and vocational recovery in schizophrenia arose from observations in our clinical experience with schizophrenia patients that appear to have growing empirical support (Corrigan et al. 1996b ). Many patients appeared to have become affectively and cognitively dysregulated by unpredictable changes in novel (untrained) social contexts and by a resulting inability to get "the big picture" regarding the nuances of interpersonal relationships and expected behavior (i.e., secondary socialization problems in context appraisal and perspective taking). As we describe below, evidence for our clinical observations is largely indirect at this time.
The social cognitive impairments of many schizophrenia patients may arise from neurodevelopmental insult, but similar social cognitive deficits also appear to characterize those that are unequivocally compromised by reason of traumatic brain injury. Intensive case studies of focal injury clearly illustrate the relationship between brain trauma and pervasive disabilities in social and emotional intelligence (Damasio 1994) . In dramatic cases, IQ and memory may be preserved but social judgment is inoperative (Brothers 1990) . Relatives of those with traumatic brain injury describe the most burdensome, longterm sequelae of injury not as abiding problems in neuropsychological competence, but as changes in "personality" (Brooks and McKinlay 1983) . Some investigators have characterized this phenomenon as "social cognitive regression" to earlier developmental levels (Santoro and Spiers 1994) . We cite references to the traumatic brain injured simply to indicate that the mild focal insult of the traumatically injured and the diffuse insults of the developmentally compromised often share important functional impairments in the exercise of social cognition, i.e., a final common pathway of cerebral insult. We do not imply, however, that this is the psychoanalytic mechanism of "regression to primitive processing" in schizophrenia. Rather, we are inclined to view the social cognition of schizophrenia patients as reflecting an inappropriate reliance on earlier acquired controlled or serial processing styles that served a necessary purpose prepubertally but render the automatic and abstract (parallel) processing of adult life more difficult.
Indirect evidence that social cognition might be developmentally compromised in schizophrenia has a rich history. Researchers have reported on the poor premorbid social dysfunctioning of many adult patients (Klorman et al. 1977) , neuropsychological problems among high-risk children (Asarnow 1988) , the social adjustment problems of adolescents with mothers who have schizophrenia (Dworkin et al. 1994) , the developmental difficulties of some children who later develop schizophrenia (Watt 1978) , and the preschizophrenia child's inclination toward atypical emotional expression (Walker and Lewine 1990) . Among those already affected with schizophrenia, more direct evidence demonstrates impairment in various social cognitive abilities. Bellack et al. (1994) found that schizophrenia patients and other psychiatrically impaired patients are greatly compromised in their ability to generate, evaluate, and implement solutions to interpersonal problems, a difficulty that Corrigan and Toomey (1995) and Penn et al. (1996) relate more to social cognitive deficits than to nonsocial, neuropsychological impairments. Extensive failures in the relevance and depth of social problem solving among schizophrenia patients and other severely mentally ill patients have also been demonstrated by others (Donahoe et al. 1990) , another indication of the importance, albeit nonspecific, of social cognitive deficits. Corrigan and colleagues (Corrigan and Green 1993a; Corrigan and Toomey 1995) have shown that the schizophrenia patient's insensitivity to social cues, particularly abstract cues, is in part also related to aspects of negative symptoms. The most socially isolated and vocationally disadvantaged patients, for example, seem to be those characterized by negative symptoms (Andreasen 1985; Jackson et al. 1989 ). Corrigan and Green (19936) further cite patient recognition of concrete rather than abstract situational features of social contexts that govern appropriate behavior. Moreover, continuing studies suggest that these abstracting deficits might be influenced by the "unfamiliar" social situations that patients find "uncomfortable," another important directive for social cognitive rehabilitation (Corrigan et al. 19966) . Further, affect perception among chronic schizophrenia patients is also thought to be impaired (Mueser et al. 1997) , as is social knowledge, which has been described as social naivete (Cutting and Murphy 1990) , the converse of interpersonal wisdom. More recently, these social knowledge deficits have also been associated with impairments in nonsocial cognition as well (McEvoy et al. 1996 ). In a rare repeated assessment study, Penn et al. (1993) have shown that social cognitive problems persist in schizophrenia from the acute through remission stages. However, most published studies of social problem solving appear to be cross-sectional assessments of a behavioral approach involving hospitalized schizophrenia patients (Bellack et al. 1989; Green 1996) . To our knowledge, relevant social cognitive deficits and their potential response to a developmental intervention have not been examined longitudinally among rehabilitation-ready and symptomatically stable schizophrenia outpatients.
Again, while social cognitive impairment is not specific to a diagnosis of schizophrenia, it does have therapeutic relevance for schizophrenia. Clearly, individuals afflicted with, for example, childhood autism or mental retardation, also display pronounced social cognitive deficits. However, the nature and subsequent remediation of social cognitive deficits would be very different when the developmental sequelae were usually manifest in late adolescence or early adulthood, as with schizophrenia, and thus affected the acquisition of secondary socialization skills, than when the functional disabilities were first apparent in childhood and adversely affected primary socialization skills.
Some might also challenge the concept of a developmentally compromised social cognition in schizophrenia by citing evidence of good premorbid functioning in many adult patients. Clearly, neurodevelopmental anomalies have not been found in all cases of schizophrenia studied (Weinberger 1996) . However, the developmental hypothesis implies a delay in manifest problems; namely, that latent social cognitive deficits in allegedly good premorbid patients might not become apparent until challenged by the interpersonal demands of early adult life . For example, educationally appropriate employment, courtship, marriage, and childrearing tasks seldom appear to be realized among most male patients with schizophrenia, independent of premorbid status (Hogarty 1988) . Elsewhere, indirect but supporting evidence suggests that schizophrenia patients function better in sheltered vocational settings (Bond and Boyer 1988 ) and achieve superior outcomes in cultures that are less socially demanding and complex (Warner 1983) ; in other words, good premorbid status could be an artifact of unchallenging environments. Many nonpatients also fail to achieve higher levels of "operational intelligence" (a form of practical intelligence) in the Piagetian sense, but they still manage successful social and vocational lives. Again, this seeming paradox might also reflect a self-selection process or fortuitous environments that don't require complex instrumental and expressive roles and the associated social cognitive skills.
. Finally, one could question the validity of existing premorbid measures as indicators of social cognitive competence. All measures (Klorman et al. 1977 ) variably assess, retrospectively, the most global of behavioral domains, such as peer friendships; levels of isolation; and interest in school activities, hobbies, or members of the opposite sex. No epidemiological study of high-risk, prepubertal children, to our knowledge, has assessed the essential components of social cognition, such as perspective taking, context appraisal, negotiation, and foresightful planning. Most studies assess only broad aspects of mood and behavior as measures of social competence (Olin and Mednick 1996) . The existing evidence largely indicates that prepubertal deficits in neuropsychological (nonsocial) cognition might predict failure in social cognition during adolescence or adulthood or that adolescent social cognition predicts adult mental status (Asarnow 1988) . Longitudinal studies could be interpreted as indicating that high-risk children who eventually develop schizophrenia simply failed to advance social cognition in step with their unaffected peers, rather than having suffered a progressive deterioration of social cognitive ability from a good premorbid, pre-or early adolescent baseline. It is more likely that the good premorbid competence assessed by traditional measures simply reflects a mastery of primary socialization skills, but not secondary socialization skills .
In summary, the functional deficits of schizophrenia are at least associated with problems in social cognition, and, as might be true with neuropsychological deficits, could also have been developmentally compromised in many patients. Rehabilitation might thus require a developmentally guided approach to their remediation.
Normal Cognitive Development and Schizophrenia
If one accepts a developmental basis to social cognitive dysfunctioning in schizophrenia, the next step is to examine the developmental stages at which normal subjects acquire nonsocial and social cognitive competencies. These insights from developmental and social psychology might serve to place in perspective both the nature and the age relevance of developmental failures in schizophrenia that require rehabilitation.
Developmentally, there is a prepubertal stage of life (ages 7 to 10) where significant limitations in selective attention, effective inhibition, working memory, and problem solving are, in fact, the norm (Spreen and Strauss 1991; Howe and Pasnak 1993) . Moreover, the main characteristic of cognitive processing during this period is its slowness (Kail 1993) . Evidence for this has been well established from (1) studies that document perseveration errors and fewer categories achieved on the Wisconsin Card Sort Test (Chelune and Baer 1986) ; (2) errors on the Stroop Test (Comalli et al. 1962) ; (3) average evoked potential anomalies (Taylor 1988) ; (4) failures of anterior lobe activation (Matsuura 1985) ; and (5) performance deficits in language, attention, and field independence tests (Dempster 1993) . Concurrently, there are also inefficient, but age-appropriate, prepubertal social cognitive strategies that have been described by such pioneers as Piaget, Mead, Cameron, Kohlberg, Baldwin, and Sullivan. This literature, as reviewed by Selman and Schultz (1990) , provides a theoretical grounding for our social cognitive approach. The evidence describes a concrete or egocentric understanding of other people prepubertally; a relative underdevelopment of language meaning, reciprocity, perspective taking, negotiation, empathy, reflection, context appraisal, planning, and foresight; and the use of "procedural" (if ... then) relational cognitive scripts (Baldwin 1992 ) that appear central to adult social cognition. These social cognitive capacities can eventually be acquired developmentally through meaningful secondary socialization experiences across the life span, as described by Brim (1966) and tested by Selman and Schultz (1990) . The processes that underlie secondary socialization are useful in understanding both the normal acquisition of social cognition and the consequences that follow the socialization failures in schizophrenia.
Primary socialization involves an apprehension of the social structure and concrete rules that govern the "objective world." As described by Berger and Luckman (1966) these basic skills are developmentally acquired by children through the instruction and sanction of adults, particularly parents (e.g., "Don't spill your milk," "Watch your tone of voice," "Don't hit your sister"). Secondary socialization arises from but extends far beyond primary socialization. It includes the independently acquired "subjective subworlds" that necessitate practical knowledge of the affects, vocabulary, and informal rules of conduct associated with the expanded and more adult roles that one encounters in new social contexts (such as becoming a clinician or a neuroscientist). In contemporary, nonlinear models of social cognition, feedback loops are thought to exist not only among the various stages of social cognitive processing (such as encoding, interpreting, response selection, and enactment) but also between the feedback recalled from prior peer evaluations and the initiation of a new response (Crick and Dodge 1994) . Thus normal social cognition arises from continuing and hence developmentally acquired secondary socialization experiences that include one's working memory for past social goals; past outcomes; the appraisal of prior social contexts, including the intentions and behavior of others; and an evaluation of one's own responses and associated affects. Spontaneous awareness of social exchanges from past and present experience is thus thought to slowly shape the development of social cognition.
Through these reciprocal interactions, healthy adults routinely socialize with each other over their lifetime as environments and contexts change. However, when one adult routinely appears not to get "the big picture," as is likely among many patients with schizophrenia (i.e., when a patient fails to correctly encode, remember, interpret, or respond to the subtle cues regarding context-specific rules, affects, and language), then other adults will often cease or greatly limit further interaction. This process of "desocializing" a person with poorly developed social cognitive skills has been well described and includes the consequences that lead to increased deviance and idiosyncratic behavior. Various authors (e.g., Cameron and Margaret 1951) cite the functional disabilities of schizophrenia that follow upon the desocialization process, including social withdrawal, progressive isolation, and broad social dysfunctioning. These behaviors have recently been shown to characterize the adjustment of patients for more than 2 years prior to schizophrenia onset (Hafner et al. 1998) , and they effectively preclude the acquisition and maintenance of social cognitive skills that depend on continuing secondary socialization.
While the characteristics of prepubertal social cognition that have not been advanced through secondary socialization might resonate among clinicians as being all-too-common features of adult schizophrenia, it is again necessary to indicate that only indirect evidence of such impairments in schizophrenia exist. To our knowledge, few if any of the above indicators of social cognition have been measured prospectively, or retrospectively, among patients with schizophrenia, either in the epidemiology, high-risk, phenomenology, or rehabilitation literatures. Clearly, many of the better established nonsocial cognitive problems of schizophrenia patients (e.g., ineffective attentional inhibition and working memory difficulties [Goldman-Rakic 1990] ) are more similar to prepubertal function. But again, the neural connectivity and hence underlying mechanisms among patients are likely to be different. Some might argue that even suggesting associations between adult schizophrenic cognition and that of normal prepubertal subjects is akin to using childhood stature as a clue to adult dwarfism. But this would misconstrue our central message from developmental psychology (although studies of childhood growth hormone function ultimately did provide insights into the nature of arrested stature). Rather, what is important are the developmental processes that emerge in most normal preadolescents whereby they eventually resolve their sensitivity to performance interference and slowness of processing, and concurrently achieve a level of intimacy and empathic understanding, a skill at negotiating role complexities, a foresightful planning capacity, and a more meaningful use of language, all of which seem associated with successful social and vocational functioning (Selman and Schultz 1990). Obviously, if many schizophrenia patients have cerebral insults, these might preclude certain normal neurodevelopmental processes perinatally or during young adult life (Feinberg 1997) and, in fact, might provoke atypical cerebral activation (Weinberger 1996) . But a rehabilitation approach that could stimulate the normative developmental processes of social cognition might prove useful given the potential of neuroplasticity and the acquisition of social intelligence through many decades (Sternberg et al. 1995) . But the key elements of metacognition would have to be identified and incorporated in an operational clinical strategy. Without ongoing opportunities for clinically guided secondary socialization experiences, schizophrenia patients would likely be at a marked disadvantage in acquiring and elaborating the metacognitive components of social cognition.
The Normative Metacognitive Processes of CET
Having suggested the nature and the age relevance of social cognitive failures in schizophrenia, we turn to the abstracting processes that facilitate the achievement of these developmental milestones in normal subjects. As recently summarized by Silverstein (1997) , the problem faced by the field of cognitive rehabilitation "is not the relevance of cognitive tasks to social skill remediation in schizophrenia; rather, it is the definition of those underlying processes related to social functioning in schizophrenia ... and the interventions to improve them." (Italics added.) We hope that the identification of one or more processes that might be clinically enhanced could lead to the formation of a developmentally appropriate and hence more effective intervention.
While various cognitive models historically have been used to explain the cross-sectional assessments of schizophrenic cognition that were measured in the laboratory (Straube and Oades 1992) , these deficits have rarely been examined from a developmental perspective. The development perspective elaborates the progressive shift from a prepubertal reliance on relatively concrete, effortful processing to the more abstracting and less demanding cognitive processing of late adolescence and early adulthood (Howe and Pasnak 1993) . In contemporary cognitive models, children have been shown to be developmentally endowed with the capacity to acquire highly concrete schemata, called verbatim memory (Brainerd and Reyna 1993) . Following the well-established Principle of Least Effort in human cognition (Zipf 1949) , nature slowly provides an easy way out of the growing problem of acquiring and remembering multiple pieces of information through a process of cognitive "downsizing" or "reduction to essence," whereby only fuzzy trace elements of verbatim memory stores persist (Brainerd and Reyna 1990) . These elements are called "gists." Social gists, for example, would include the personally meaningful and abstract relational schemata, attributions and inferences, and rules and principles that underlie perspective taking and context appraisal. As elaborated by Reyna (1990, 1993) , with age and cerebral maturation (including neural pruning and the reinforcement of crucial neural circuits [Keshavan and Murray 1997] ), primary gists are increasingly extracted from stimuli as new sources of meaning are used to elaborate and reconstruct existing gists. Verbatim stores are unstable, quick to fade from memory, extremely hard to recall, and greatly subject to interference-all cognitive features that are common in schizophrenia. Gists, on the other hand, require far less effort to recall. Perhaps, as is true for schizophrenia patients and those among them who are treated with sequential behavioral strategies, individuals who process information in the serial fashion of a specific response paradigm tend to become subject to cognitive interference. A problem subsequently arises, for example, in having to continuously edit or inhibit existing verbatim or semantic memory stores or an earlier acquired primitive gist (Brainerd and Reyna 1993) . A developed gist-acquisition capacity, on the other hand, leads to multiple and spontaneous behavioral responses rather than discrete, controlled, situation-defined responses. Corollary evidence for gistful cognition can be found in recent developmental studies of effective inhibition (Dempster 1993; Harnishfeger and Bjorkland 1993) . In a compensatory manner, nature again provides the growing child with the capacity for "intentional forgetting and selective remembering" (Lehman and Bovasso 1993) . The relatively fewer stimuli that are remembered likely represent the trace stores that contain the gist of things, a process greatly facilitated by a developmental shift from serial (controlled) to parallel (automatic) processing.
While controlled and automatic processing appear to be highly interrelated (Schneider et al. 1984) , Asarnow and colleagues (1994) suggest in their extensive studies of schizophrenic cognition that schizophrenic "deficits in controlled processing may lead to deficient development of automatic operations. Conversely, deficient automaticity results in overutilization of controlled processes." This "serial search defect," which is characteristic of childhood and adult schizophrenia, appears to be associated with increased demands (and processing activity) on a limited capacity system (Strandburg et al. 1994 ), a phenomenon that suggests to us a strong reliance on verbatim memory. Some argue that these controlled, serial search deficits are particularly characteristic of paranoid individuals (Magaro 1981) . Perhaps Bellack et al.'s (1989) criticism regarding social problem-solving approaches to schizophrenia (i.e., that normal subjects do not consciously engage in sequential, stepwise processing) represents an appeal similar to Corrigan et al.'s (1996a) to enhance the requisite abstracting ability of normal social cognition for schizophrenia patients, much like the wise individual who is actually cognitively "sloppy," ignoring details by going straight to the heart or "gist" of the problem (Brainerd and Reyna 1993) .
Thus to reduce information complexity, nature is inclined to "making it simple" by getting to the "essence" of things. This process seems to involve a decreasing reliance on both verbatim memory and serial, controlled processing (characteristic of schizophrenic and normal prepubertal cognition) and an increasing use of less demanding cognitive strategies such as intentional forgetting and extraction and enhancement of gists in a parallel, automatic processing mode (i.e., the features of normal, young adult cognition). These developmental cognitive processes might profitably be addressed in a rehabilitation program designed to facilitate a more abstracting social cognition for schizophrenia patients. When operationalized through the use of developmental exercises targeted to the acquisition of secondary socialization abilities, such as context appraisal and perspective taking, the resulting approach might ultimately represent a Cognitive Enhancement Therapy for schizophrenia.
